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RECENT DECISIONS
the law and a creature of equity depending not on contract but upon
principles of equity and justice.9
It is apparent that there will be no uniformity among the deci-
sions until a ruling on the question is made by a Circuit Court of
Appeals or by the United States Supreme Court, or until the Federal
Tort Claims Act is amended to specifically allow or disallow such
claims by an insurance company as subrogee.
J. B. McG.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-EVICTION UNDER EMERGENCY RENT
ACT-COOPERATIVE OWNERSrIP.-The defendant tenant occupied
the apartment since 1941, having gone into possession under a lease
with the corporate owner. In July 1946 the lessor, corporation sold
the apartment house, assigning the defendant's lease to the new
owners. In 1947 a cooperative was formed and the property deeded
to it. At the time of the trial the entire building was under co-
operative ownership. The plaintiff acquired shares of stock in the
new company, plus a proprietary lease purporting to give her the
right to possession of the defendant's apartment for ninety-nine years
with the right to one hundred year renewals. The plaintiff then
served the defendant with statutory notice to quit and upon her re-
fusal to quit brought this action to evict her. In the trial court, with
a jury, the plaintiff was successful. The principal defense was to the
effect that the plaintiff was just another tenant, and not an owner
or landlord under the act 1 defining a landlord as "an owner, lessor,
sub-lessor, or other person entitled to receive rent for the use or
occupancy of any housing accommodation." Held, for the plaintiff, as
a landlord under the classification mentioned. Hicks v. Bigelow, 55
A. 2d 924 (Mun. Ct. of App. D. C. 1947).
The pivotal point in the case is the determination of the plain-
tiff's position as a landlord. The defendant's contention that she is
merely another tenant would seem to gain support from the common
law conception of a personal relationship between the landlord and
tenant,2 and the required presence of certain essentials such as per-
mission and consent of the landlord to the occupancy, subordination
to the landlord's title, reversion, and generally some contractual re-
lationship express or implied.3 However, the case is decided under
a statutory definition, and one which is quite common, being sub-
stantially the same as the New York Emergency Rent Laws applying
9 Wojciuk v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 914 (E. D. Wisc. 1947) ; accord,
Grace v. United States (Maryland) (no opinion for publication).
1D. C. CODE Supp. V. 45-1611(g) (1940).
2 WALSH, TnE LAw oF PROPERTY 233 (2d ed. 1937).
3 See Note, 51 C. J. S., Landlord and Tenant § 2 (1947).
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to housing, comnnercial, and business space, 4 and the Administrative
Code of the City of New York.5
The District of Columbia Court notes that the issue involved has
arisen principally in New York State, and in substantiation of its
views cites the case of 542 Morris Park Avenue v. Wilkins, involv-
ini, summary proceedings for possession of apartments, brought in
that case by the cooperative corporation in behalf of its stockholders,
wherein it was held that the stockholders were in effect regarded as
the owners of .the rooms occupied or to be occupied by them. This
same view appears again in Curtis v. Le May,7 holding as in the in-
stant case, that the cooperative stockholder, the proprietary lessee,
".... starids in the position of the landlord-lessor and acquires all of
that entity's rights." 8 In Curtis v. Le May, however, there is an
important distinction in that the plaintiff was also the assignee of
the lease under which the defendant was in possession, rents having
been collected for the plaintiff's account, which in itself established
a basis for a landlord-tenant relationship.
The question as to who are proper parties to bring actions for
possession under this type of statutory definition has arisen more
frequently with regard to business and commercial space. The great
majority of cases have held uniformly that ownership of -stock in
corporations holding title to real property does not enable stockholders
to maintain proceedings for possession.9 The courts have required
a possessory right, a legal title, as a condition, and a clear compli-
ance with statutory definitions. There is an aversion to any relax-
ation of laws such as those under discussion, being born as they are
4 Laws of N. Y. 1946, c. 274, amended by L. 1947, c. 704; Laws of N. Y.
1947, a. 822, c. 823.
5 § U-41-7.0(b) (4) (1947).
6 120 Misc. 48, 197 N. Y. Supp. 625 (Sup. Ct. 1922). (The issue involved
in the Morris Park case arose again in the later New York case of Smith v.
Feigin, - App. Div. - 77 N. Y. S. 2d 229 (1st Dep't 1948), where the
Appellate Term of the gupreme Court criticized the holding that cooperative
stockholders should be considered as owners of the rooms occupied or to be
occupied by them, contending that there was no authority for such a proposi-
tion. However, on appeal the Appellate Division unanimously reversed the
Appellate Term and concluded that such stock ownership did bring the plain-
tiff within the 9cope of the statutory requirement of owner, thus holding
squarely with the Washington court in the instant case.)
7 186 Misc. 853, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 768 (Mun. Ct. 1945).8 Id. at 856, 60 N. Y. S. 2d at 770.
9 Dit mars Homes v. Logerfo, 188 Misc. 286, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 414 (Mun.
Ct. 1946) ; Nathan Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Moglen, 185 Misc. 831, 58 N. Y. S.
2d 714 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; Tishman Realty & Const. Co. v. Wolf, 185 Misc. 317,
57 N. Y. S. 2d 73 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; Trade Accessories v. Bellet, 184 Misc. 962,
55 N. Y. S. 2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Contra: 816 5th Avenue v. Leonard,
188 Misc. 728, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 386 (Mun. Ct. 1947). See also Stephens,




of emergencies, and designed to protect existing tenancies.' 0 This
need for strict construction is also based on the premise that the
emergency laws are a stricture on the common law, and that liberal
interpretations should therefore be avoided.1"
It should also be noted that the issue of the good faith of the
plaintiff in seeking possession is a basic factor.12 In the instant case
that fact was decided favorably for the plaintiff by the jury. Good
faith would seem to assume additional importance in view of the
obvious possibilities for unscrupulous schemes in cooperative arrange-
ments with the present housing conditions.
In general it would seem that the holding of the District of
Columbia court, while being just under the circumstances, cannot be
treated as conclusive of the fact that stockholders should be deemed
owners or landlords of portions of the property held by the coopera-
tive corporation, even under the statutory definitions cited.
D. J. C.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS.-A Wash-
ington, D. C. corporation leased a store upon the defendant's covenant
"that he will use said premises for the sale of alcoholic beverages and
other items usually associated-with the sale of liquor for 'Off Sale'
[Off Premises] consumption and for no other purpose whatsoever."
Defendant subsequently discontinued the operation of the liquor
store. The plaintiff corporation brought action for possession on the
grounds that the covenant had been violated by the discontinuance,
and further alleged that, since the store was in a parking center, its
non-use constituted waste. The corporation's motion for summary
judgment was denied; and, when it elected to stand on its motion,
judgment was given to the defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Held, the
covenant was restrictive and not mandatory. It was for the litigants
to adopt language that would have clearly shown the intent to im-
pose upon the defendant the duty of continuing in possession.
Congressional Amusement Corporation v. Weltnman, 55 A. 2d 95
(Mun. Ct. of App. D. C. 1947).
The plaintiffs argue that the agreement implicitly meant not only
that it would not be used for any other purpose, but that it must be
used. They contend that an unoccupied store is just as undesirable
10 Reconstruction Syndicate v. Sharpe, 186 Misc. 897, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 176
(Mun. Ct. 1946).
II Kristal v. Steinberg, 188 Misc. 500, 69 N. Y: S. 2d 476 (Mun. Ct. 1947).
12 Richelieu Realty Co. v. Mangin, 187 Misc. 440, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 381 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
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